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Abstract:  For many agricultural products, the quality of the final products strongly depends on different stages 
of the productive chain.  This stresses the importance of relationships between quality signal owners and 
suppliers in the vertical chain.  Based on a New Institutional Economics analysis, the goal of this paper is 
twofold: (i) to design a framework to study the links between quality signaling, coordination in the supply chains 
and the institutional environment, (ii) to conduct a comparative analysis to identify, compare and explain the 
modes of organization implemented for the governance of different quality signs.  The general hypothesis is that, 
in order to assure the credibility of a quality signal, there must be an efficient alignment between quality 
characteristics and governance of the supply chain.  To test this general hypothesis, we have conducted a 
comparative analysis of 42 case studies in 3 sectors (processed meat, cheese, fruit and vegetable sectors) from 7 
European countries.  This diversity allows us to compare the organizations designed to govern different quality 
signals in different institutional environments and to test the matching between quality signals and governance 
structures. 
 
Keywords: alignment, credibility, governance structures, quality signals. 
 
JEL Classification : L14, L15, L22 
                                                           
 A previous draft of this research was presented at the 78
th EAAE Seminar on the "Economics of Contracts in 
Agriculture and the Food Supply Chain", Copenhagen, July 2001.   
This study is part of a research which has been carried out with financial support of the EU Commission FAIR 
program PL 98-4404 (1999-2001), "Quality Strategies and Producer's Organizations in the European Agro-food 
Sector: Consumer Information and Competition Policy".  This study does not reflect the views of the EU and 
does not anticipate its future policy.  Several persons in France (coordinating team) were involved in this project 
: Armelle Mazé, Stéphanie Polin, Emmanuel Raynaud, Loïc Sauvée, Egizio Valceschini. 
 
✚  Corresponding author : eraynaud@inapg.inra.fr    2
1.  Introduction 
For many agrofood products, the consumer is not always aware of the quality of the 
product, or the accuracy of the information regarding the product characteristics. Economists, 
following Akerlof (1970) have shown that the experience and confidence goods (or 
characteristics) are liable to a very strong adverse selection problem when the price is the only 
information available on quality.  The use of quality signals may mitigate the adverse 
selection problem.  By improving consumer information, the creation of a quality signal 
restores part of the efficiency of the market.  For the purpose of this paper, quality signal is 
defined as: (i) a distinctive name that differentiates one product from another, either 
vertically, or horizontally, (ii) a name that provides consumers with (sometimes implicit) 
information about characteristics of the product, these characteristics being summarized in a 
logo or a name. 
 
From an empirical point of view, there is a diversity of quality signals.  The brand 
name is probably the most well known. A second type of quality signal that plays an 
important role in the European agri-food sector is the denomination of origin, either because 
the area of origin actually signals significant differences in the characteristics or because of its 
symbolic content.  In Europe, Protected Denomination of Origin (PDO) and Protected 
Geographical Indication (PGI) link products to their geographical origin and provide an 
official certification on some products' attributes (for instance traditional methods of 
production).  There is now a huge amount of literature on quality signaling and labeling (see 
for instance, Caswell and Mojduszka, 1996). However, only a few studies deal with the 
contractual and organizational issues of a product’s quality (Caswell, Bredhal and Hooker, 
2000, Hueth, Ligon, Wolf and Wu, 1999). 
 
In the same time, there is also a diversity of organizational forms that support quality 
strategies.  Following Mighell and Jones (1963), scholars emphasized the diversity of vertical 
coordination in the food industry (see for instance Frank and Henderson, 1992, and Peterson 
and Wysocki, 1998, for a description of vertical coordination in the US).  However, to our 
knowledge, no systematic studies on the vertical coordination in the European agri-food 
sectors exist. 
 
We expect that the choice of vertical coordination within the supply chains depends on 
the quality strategy adopted by one or several agents (in the case of a collective brand) of a 
supply chain.  This is due to the fact that quality signaling in the final markets involves higher 
contractual hazards in the downstream transactions with suppliers. If the quality of the final 
product sold under a quality signal depends on the behavior of several agents in the chain 
(owner of the signal and suppliers), there is a moral hazard problem.  How can it be 
guaranteed that the quality of the goods sold under a brand name will remain constant and 
homogeneous? This is the credibility problem of the quality signal. 
 
In this paper, the governance of transactions in the supply chain is studied as a way to 
support the credibility of quality signals.  We therefore assume that the governance structures 
that are designed in the vertical chain try to guarantee the quality to the final consumer. 
Quality signaling may lead to the adoption of hybrid forms or vertical integration rather than a 
spot market to cope with these hazards.  We then expect to see a covariation between the 
characteristics of quality signals and the governance mechanisms in the supply chains. Using 
a sample of case studies in several European agri-food chains, our goal is twofold: (i) to   3
characterize the diversity of organizational forms in our case studies, (ii) to explain this 
diversity by the heterogeneity of quality strategies. Different quality signals give rise to 
different credibility issues and contractual hazards that in turn imply different governance 
structures.  In order to test the general hypothesis, we present the methodology used to 
conduct a discrete structural analysis of 42 case studies in three different agri-food sectors 
(cheese, processed meat, fruit and vegetables sectors) in seven European countries (France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, UK).  This population covers the diversity of 
quality signs that one can find in the agri-food sectors (retailer label, processor’s individual 
brand name, official quality sign, etc.).  
 
Compared to previous literature on quality signaling and organization, this ongoing 
research is the first cross-national study that attempts to compare alternative modes of 
organization governing different quality signals.  Only a few studies deal with the issue of 
backward coordination induced by quality strategy using the New Institutional Economics 
(NIE) framework (see e.g., de Azevedo and dos Santos Silva, 1999, Hobbs and Young, 2000, 
Ménard, 1996).  We also investigate these questions from a Transaction Cost Economics 
perspective (Williamson, 1991, 1996).  The cross-national nature of our sample allows us to 
take into account the influence of institutional environment on governance choices (North, 
1990). 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we will present 
our population of case studies, develop a simple taxonomy of quality signals and a typology 
of governance structures in the vertical chains.  In the last section the arguments concerning 
the links between quality strategy and governance of the supply chain are developed. We will 
design a reduced form framework to study the diversity of quality signs and governance 
modes.  The conclusion follows. 
2. Governance Structures for Quality Signaling: Empirical Analysis 
In this section, we present our population.  We mainly focus on the analysis of the two 
main set of variables we would like to link: on the one hand the quality strategies and, on the 
other hand, the governance of transactions in the supply chains.  Our goal is to describe and 
compare the different governance structures and quality strategies in the chains.  We choose 
the case studies in order to cover a broad range of quality strategies and governance 
structures.  We develop the analysis in two subsections.  In (2.1), after a brief description of 
the data and methodology, we provide an overview of the different quality strategies we have 
in the population.  In (2.2) we analyze the governance of transactions in our population.  We 
use Williamson' works (Williamson, 1991, 1996) on governance structures to describe and 
compare the several bilateral governance structures we observed.  We then try to assess the 
governance of each supply chains by designing an aggregate measure of the extent of vertical 
integration in each case study.  
2.1  The Diversity of Quality Strategies 
Our empirical study is based on a population of 42 case studies (two cases of three sectors 
in 7 European countries
1), in three different agrofood sectors: (i) Processed meat, (ii) Fresh 
fruit and vegetables, (iii)  Cheese products.  The research is based on an in-depth description 
of case studies.  To facilitate the comparative analysis, investigations were conducted with a 
                                                           
1 France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, The Netherlands and United Kingdom   4
common questionnaire for all the case studies.  The information included in all the case 
studies is given in annex.  
 
In order to ease the comparison of quality signals in each case studies, we create several 
clusters of quality signals according to two main criteria related to the legal statute of the 
quality signal:  
y The legal statute of the quality signal: private brand (individual or collective), 
denomination of origin (PDO/PGI), certification brand (vertical axis). 
The main differences between the three clusters of quality signals rest on (i) the definition 
of quality and, (ii) the quality control mechanism.  For the official quality signal, even if 
the definition of quality comes from the agents in the supply chain, this definition must be 
approved by the state in last resort.  For the other two set of quality signals, the definition 
of quality is in the hand of one or several agents in the supply chain.  On the quality 
control issue, the PDO system is based on an official certification (by the state or 
delegated to an approved third party).  External certification is also a necessary element of 
the brand certification system.  For the private brand (individual or collective), external 
certification is not a regulatory requirement but a strategic choice of the brand's owner.  
One possible interpretation of the vertical axis is the relative importance of legal support 
or constraints defined by the institutional environment for each of these quality strategies. 
 
y The legal statute of the owner of the quality signal: collective chain organization, 
cooperative or unions of cooperatives, private firm (processors or retailers) (horizontal 
axis). 
This axis split the different case studies according to the legal form of the owner.  The 
ranking of legal forms from chain organization to private firms suggests the existence of 
an increasing degree of centralization of the brand name ownership. In PDO/PGI, the 
quality definition is in the hand of a collective chain organization (at least in the majority 
of European countries) whereas the owner of a private brand is the only one who can 
modify the definition of its products' quality. The cooperative (unions of cooperatives) 
case is in between these two polar forms.  The collective management of the quality signal 
is not a regulatory requirement but reflect the internal organization of the owner. 
 
The following figure describes the sample of case studies with the previous dimensions of 
the legal statute of the quality signal and of the legal form of the owner of the signal.  
   5

























First letter: country (F: France / G: Germany / Gr: Greece / I: Italy / N: Netherlands / S: Spain / UK: UK) 
Second letter: sector (C: cheese / M: meat sector / V: fruit and vegetables) 
 
Without being at the core of our analysis in this paper, the diversity of quality strategies 
according to our criteria partly reflects institutional differences among countries.  It illustrates 
the importance of differences in institutional environments among European countries (North, 
1990).  There is for instance strong differences in the implementation of official quality policy 
among European countries.  France, Greece, Spain and Italy have a strong tradition of 
government supports to help producers to create a quality differentiation strategy.  On the 
other hand, the provision of these strategic instruments is relatively new in United-Kingdom 
or the Netherlands
3.  Second, differences in the implementation of PDO systems exists even 
in countries with a strong tradition of official supports. In some countries, individual firms are 
subject to the compulsory adhesion to a collective organization (like in France, Italy and 
                                                           
2 For confidentiality reason, the name of the case study does not appear. 
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Spain) whereas in other countries this is not the case (Greece). The sample of case studies 
includes both situations.   
 
In most of the case studies, several quality signals co-exist for the same product (60% of 
the case studies in our population).  A lot of products have at least two different labels (for 
instance a private brand and a PDO).  This points out the importance of complementarities 
between collective and individual strategies (see Fernandez Barcala, Gonzales-Diaz and 
Arrunada, 2001 for an analysis in the Spanish meat sector).  The methodology  focussed on 
the quality signal that we judged the most important regarding the final communication to the 
consumers. 
2.2  Governance in Supply Chains: a Taxonomy 
We now turn to the description of the governance of transaction in each case study. 
We start with the description of bilateral governance structures for each transaction in all the 
case studies.  We use this description to analyze the governance of the set of transactions in 
each case. 
2.2.1 Bilateral  Governance  Structures   
In this section, we study the bilateral governance structures in the supply chains.  To 
be able to take into account the diversity of the case studies in our population, we have 
established a template of supply chain that integrates five main transactions. It should be note 
that each case study can have different chains of transactions.  For instance, the transaction 
between the first and second processing steps does not exist for the majority of case studies in 
the fruit and vegetables sector whereas the cheese industry always has two separate 
processing steps.  The length of each chain of transactions varies mainly from sector to sector.  
This technological description of the transactions in the chain corresponds to very vast 
categories
4.  The relevant transactions are the following: 
 
• transaction between farmers and their input suppliers (T.1),  
• transaction between farmers and the first transformation step (T.2), 
• transaction between the first and the second transformation steps (T.3),  
• transaction between the last transformation step and wholesalers (T.4), 
• transaction between wholesalers or the last transformation step and the retailers 
(traditional retailers and supermarket/hypermarket chains) (T.5). 
 
In order to analyze the governance of transactions in the chains, we designed a 
typology of bilateral governance structures for each transaction. This typology is inspired by 
the one used in Williamson (1996).  This reference is useful because it allows us (i) to 
disentangle different contractual relations and, (ii) to rank these relations on a Market – 
Hierarchy axis.  We use however a more detailed classification to take into account the 
diversity of the situations (different sectors, different products, different quality signals, etc.).  
With regard to Williamson’s typology, more detail is given for the category of hybrid forms.  
We distinguished six different bilateral governance structures.  Some of the definitions we use 
hereafter come from Milgrom and Roberts (1992):  
                                                           
4 Depending on the sector studied, the term “first processing” refers to different activities. In the case of the fruits 
and vegetables sector, we consider this stage to correspond mainly to the packaging of the products (sorting, 
selection, aggregation, packaging, stocking, etc.). In the cheese sector, the first level of processing corresponds 
to a real physical transformation of the product.   7
 
①  The spot market contract (S).  A contract for the immediate exchange of goods or 
services at current prices. The identity of the party is irrelevant, 
②  The relational bilateral governance (also implicit contract) (S+).  A non-written 
(non legally enforceable) contract that specifies only the general terms and objectives 
of the relationship.  This governance introduce the idea of repeated relations with the 
same agents, 
③   The relational bilateral governance with "qualified partner(s)" ( S++).  This 
structure is close to the previous one.  However, agents are not free to choose their 
partners, but have to select a "qualified" transactor (accredited for instance by a 
collective organization), 
④  The formal (written) bilateral contract (C).  A legally enforceable set of promises 
that defines all or part of each party obligations, 
⑤  The financial participation in the ownership of the partner(s) (JV).  In this case, 
buyer (respectively seller) is a stockholder of the other but stay legally independent 
from the seller (respectively buyer). Joint-venture is a canonical example of this type 
of governance structure, 
⑥  Vertical integration (VI).  Bringing two or more successive stages of the supply 
chain under common ownership and management. 
 
The following table shows the correspondence that exists between Williamson’s 
typology and ours. It also specifies the criteria that allows us to distinguish between the 
different governance structures. 
 
Table 1: typology of bilateral governance structures 
 
 Governance Structures 
 























Criteria    
Impersonal 
relations 
Yes   No   No   No   No   No  
Ex ante 
restrictions on 
choice of a 
partner 
No   No   Yes   No   Yes   Yes  
Formalization  No   No   Yes / No  Yes   Yes   Yes  
Duration  Short  Long   Short   Variable   Long   Long  




Courts   Hierarchy  
Financial 
participation 






Three main comments can be made on this typology. First, it describes and ranks the 
different bilateral governance structures.  It shows a diversity of governance structures for the   8
same or for different transactions.  As we moved from spot market to vertical integration, the 
property rights of individual agents, i.e. the rights to decide on each agent's asset, become 
more constrained by explicit commitments.  Second, the relational governance with 
"approved partners" is introduce here to take into account the possible influence of a 
"collective governance structure" in a chain that interact with bilateral governance.  Third, 
these bilateral governance structures are not exclusive from each other.  In different case 
studies, several bilateral governance structures are used simultaneously for a transaction.   
Four mixed combinations of governance structures for a particular transaction are possible in 
this typology.  
• Combination of different governance structures in the same group of governance 
structures, 
• Combination of market governance and hybrid governance, 
• Combination of market governance and vertical integration, 
• Combination of hybrid governance and vertical integration 
2.2.2   From Bilateral to Multistage Governance: an Identification of Organizational 
Forms 
We turn now to a synthetical presentation of the governance of transactions in the case 
studies.  The previous table shows the diversity of bilateral governance.  We would like to 
have a more aggregate view of the governance in each case in order to ease the comparison.  
As we defined a quality strategy by case study, we also would like to define a governance 
mode by case.  To differentiate this more aggregate level of governance from the previous 
description, we consider the governance of the whole supply chain in each case as an 
organizational form.  We defined an organizational form as a set of interstage transactions 
along the chain. Consequently, each organizational form brings together two or more bilateral 
governance structures. In order to classify these organizational forms, we defined a common 
criteria, the degree of vertical control by one of the agents (mainly the owner of the quality 
signal) on the chain.  
We operationalized this degree of vertical control with the definition of a vertical 
control  index. This index is established as follow: for a given chain we add up all the 
governance structures that imply a financial links among the partners (equity participation - 
JV - and vertical integration - VI - in the previous table) then divided by the number of 
transactions in the chain. For instance, if two transactions (out of four) in a supply chain are 
governed by vertical or equity participation governance, the value of the integration index is 
0,5 (i.e. 2/4). This calculus allows us to avoid the fact that the length of the chains in our case 
studies are not homogeneous when we consider the number of transactions. Doing so, the 
vertical control index measures the relative extent of vertical integration. It gives the degree of 
authority this owner will have on the participants in the chain.  In the following table, we give 
an example of the description of the governance structures and organizational forms for the 
cases studies in the meat sector (33% of the whole population).  
 










S++ S++ NR  S+  S+  0 
I.M.1 (chain 
org.) 
S+  C / VI   VI  S  S  0.2   9
N.M.1 (chain 
org.) 
S+ C NR C  S  0 
N.M.2 (chain 
org.) 
NR S++ NR  S  S  0 
S.M.1 (chain 
org.) 
?  S / S+  NR  S / S+  S / S+  0 
UK.M.1 
(chain org.) 
S++  S++ ? S++  S++ 0 
S.M.2  (coop)  VI VI VI VI C 0.8 
G.M.1 (coop)  JV  JV  JV  VI  VI / S+  0.8 
F.M.2 (firm)  S++  C  VI  NR  C  0.25 
G.M.2 (firm)  S++  C  VI  NR  S  0.25 
Gr.M.1 
(firm) 
S VI  VI C C 0.4 
Gr.M.2 
(firm) 
S+ / S++  VI  VI  S+  S+  0.4 
I.M.2 (firm)  S  C  VI  S  S  0.2 
UK.M.2 
(firm) 
S C  C  /  VI  NR  S++  0 
 
From this vertical control index, we define four organizational forms 
 
• No vertical integration (decentralized organizational form): integration index ∈ [0 - 
0,2],  
• Weak degree of vertical integration (mainly decentralized organizational form): 
integration index ∈ [0,2 - 0,4], 
• Intermediary degree of vertical coordination (weakly centralized organizational 
form): integration index ∈ [0,4 - 0,7], 
• Strong degree of vertical integration (centralized organizational form): integration 
index ∈ [0,7 - 1]. 
 
The repartition of case studies by organizational form (as defined below) shows a wide 
diversity.  Two case studies have a centralized organizational form, eight are of the very 
decentralized type and four are of the mainly decentralized type.  It seems that in the case 
studies in the European meat sector, the decentralized form of organization is the predominant 
one.  Similar description and ranking can be made for the rest of the population.   
 
We identified different quality signs and different governance structures. We now 
present our conceptual framework which links the diversity of quality signs with 
organizational forms. 
3. The Credibility Issue : Linking Quality Signals and Governance of 
the Supply Chain 
This section relates the mechanisms that make a quality signal credible to consumers.  
Our goal is to explain the expected relation between quality strategies and governance of the 
supply chain.  This analysis is carried out with the consideration that a quality signal is a 
contract between the consumers and the owner of the signal.  The advantage of this 
contractual analogy is to focus on the enforcement issue.  We develop the analysis in two 
subsections. In the first subsection, we develop a conceptual framework to link quality 
strategies and governance of the transaction in the supply chains (3.1).  In the second one we 
study the credibility issue when the owner of the signal is the only one able to modify the 
quality of the products.  Then we will then show that, when the quality of the products sold   10
under a quality sign depends on the behavior of various agents in the production chain, the 
governance of transactions in the vertical chain is a central element for the credibility of the 
quality signal (3.2).  We provide some preliminary evidences form the case studies in the 
meat sector (3.3). 
3.1  A General Framework: Linking Quality Strategies and Governance of the 
Supply Chains  
The analysis investigates the backward or upward coordination (governance of the 
vertical chain) induced by the creation of a quality signal. Following Transaction Cost 
Economics, the analysis is essentially comparative (Williamson, 1991). This imply an 
analysis that would allow for comparison of the different governance methods. It is necessary 
to study all the variables that can influence the choice of governance methods. The case 
studies that we have carried out are very diverse. We therefore need a framework that allows 
for the integration of this diversity. Five series of variables or parameters are adopted to try to 
explain the choice of governance structures. The following figure represents the links between 
all these items.  We mainly develop the analysis of the link between quality signal and 
governance structures (labeled "credibility issue" in the figure). 
 


















Hereafter, we briefly explain the relations (A), (B), (C), (D). 
 
Relationship between sectoral characteristics, quality signal and contractual hazards (A) 
(B) 
 
The sector characteristics partly determine the credibility problems that must be dealt 
with. For example, these characteristics inform us of potential problems related to supply and 
quality management. Many sectors are characterized by considerable fragmentation of the 
agricultural production and transformation. There exists potential heterogeneity of the quality 
that is important to the owner of the quality signal (in particular if he sells his products under 
a commercial brand name). The study of the production process in a given sector also gives us 
information regarding the quality management problems in the chains. For example, in the 
fresh fruit and vegetable sector, a strong heterogeneity of the raw materials will exist a priori 
(in space and in time).  
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Relationships between institutional environment, quality signal, and governance 
structures (C) (D) 
 
Following North (1990), institutional environment is defined here as the "rules of the 
game". Due to their cross-national nature, the differences in institutional environments and 
market structures must be included in our analysis because they can influence the governance 
design (Williamson, 1991, 1996). They encompass differences in terms of development of the 
collective producer's organization, the development of official quality signaling and 
certification, etc. We try to evaluate the heterogeneity at the institutional level between 
different countries.  
3.2  The Quality Signal as a Contract: the Credibility Issue 
The credibility of a quality signal can be studied by taking into consideration that a 
quality signal is a contract between the producers and the consumers.  Credibility is defined as 
the respect by the owner of the sign to (sometimes implicit) promises made through the 
quality signal.  The interpretation of a quality signal as a contract was suggested by Klein and 
Leffler (1981).  This is a useful analogy as it allows for the study of the diversity of 
enforcement mechanisms used to support the credibility of the quality signals.  This 
commitment problem depends on the considered situation.  We first consider the case where 
the owner of a quality signal is the only one who can influence the level of quality.  Next, we 
introduce agency considerations by allowing several agents of the supply chain to influence 
the products' quality. 
3.2.1  The Reference Case: Credibility as an Exclusive Function of the Owner 
Behavior 
In this section, we assume that the owner of the quality signal is the only one that can 
influence the quality
5. Consequently, the problem of enforcement of the brand name contract 
rests exclusively on his decisions.  The only relevant transaction is between the owner of the 
quality signal and the consumers. 
There now exists a great amount of literature that deals with the incentives of an 
individual producer to respect his commitments with regard to the quality of the products.  
For a producer to have an incentive to continuously produce high quality, a price premium 
must exist as a reward for high quality (Klein and Leffler, 1981, Shapiro, 1983).  It represents 
the economic value of the individual producer’s reputation.  It is therefore the threat of 
termination of the relationship by the consumer and the loss of the quasi rent that makes the 
implicit brand name contract self-enforcing.  
Other mechanisms of quality safeguarding are also available to guarantee the quality 
of the products.  The certification by a third party is an example.  This third party can be a 
private or public intermediary. In the case of a public intermediary, official certification is 
necessary.  The denomination of origin in the European Union (PGO / PGI) rest, for example, 
on an official certification by a third party.  These polar forms of quality enforcement 
consumers co-exist for numerous products.  It is therefore frequent that a company will use an 
official quality signal that rests both on the origin of the products and on the private 
commercial brand name.  
                                                           
5 One can alternatively think of a situation where there is a (perfect) complete contract between the owner of the 
quality signal and all other agents who can influence the products' quality.   12
3.2.2 Credibility  and  Governance of the Supply Chain: a Reduced Form Framework 
The framework that we propose is a reduced form insofar as we consider that the 
choice of quality strategy is exogenous. In a more general model, the choice of quality 
strategy and the governance of the vertical chain are both endogenous variables that depend 
on external variables. This methodology is close to the one used by Williamson to study the 
choice of governance structures. In most parts of his analysis, the attributes of the transactions 
are considered to be exogenous variables used to predict the organizational choices from the 
alignment hypothesis between the attributes of the transactions and the governance structures.  
From figure 2, we now mainly focus on the relations between quality signals, contractual 
hazards and governance structures. 
 










Why do study the relationship between product quality and governance of the vertical 
chain? Because, for many products, the quality of the final product sold under the quality 
signal greatly depends on different stages of the vertical chain. Several quality attributes 
signaled to the consumers (and so the credibility of the quality signal) depend on prior stages, 
from processors to, sometimes, farmers or input suppliers. 
 
The general hypothesis is that the governance structures that are designed in the 
vertical chain try to guarantee the quality to the final consumer. The governance structures are 
therefore studied as a safeguard for the credibility of the quality signal. The reputation of the 
quality signal is a specific asset that procures a quasi rent for its owner (for example, in the 
form of a price premium for his products). The profitability of this asset (for example, the 
price premium) depends not only on the behavior of the owner but also on the behavior of the 
other agents in the vertical chain (suppliers and/or distributors). It may be necessary to adopt 
certain governance structures in the vertical chain that offer greater control over agents who 
strongly influence final quality. If the suppliers must satisfy certain specifications in order to 
be the supplier of the owner of the quality signal (for instance, specific characteristics of the 
raw material), these requirements may increase the degree of asset specificity.   
The natural attributes of the technology and of the products also determine the nature 
and the intensity of the credibility problems.  Certain products, such as fresh vegetables, are 
subject to strong climatic uncertainty that influences both the quality and the quantity of 
products available.  They are also subject to strong perishability constraints.  These different 
elements imply a strong uncertainty for the owner of the quality signal and some form of asset 
specificity (for instance temporal specificity as pointed out by Pirrong, 1993).  The problems 
relating to supply management, to quality and quantity, would be different if the products are 
transformed and sold, for example, in cans.  
 
The creation of a quality signal therefore modifies the attributes of the transactions.  
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are not the only ones.  When a quality signal is used by several legally autonomous producers 
(for instance for PDO / PGI products), each individual producer has incentives to encourage 
the others to make the costly investments required to maintain quality while shading one's 
own effort to do so and free riding on the collective reputation.  Each producer, being legally 
autonomous, is a residual claimant and tries to maximize the profits of his company.  The 
individual behaviors toward profit maximization can have harmful effects on the other 
producers that use the same quality signal (see Lafontaine and Raynaud, 2001, for an 
application to franchising). 
 
The creation of a quality signal leads to a modification of contractual hazards in the 
vertical chain (different intensity or a new type of hazards). The owner of the sign will 
therefore implement governance structures that can reduce contractual hazards (Furquim de 
Azevedo and dos Santos Silva, 1999, Hobbs and Young, 2000).  The quality signal would 
then be considered credible if an efficient alignment exists between the governance of the 
vertical chain and the contractual hazards that arise from the strategic choices for a particular 
quality definition. 
3.2.3  Some Preliminary Evidences in the Meat Sector 
In the meat sector, the organizational forms varies greatly, from very decentralized to 
centralized organizational forms.  A few preliminary comments may be done regarding the 
case studies.  In some case, the decision holder is a chain organization (quoted chain org. in 
table 2), in some other case, the decision holder is an individual firm or a cooperative.  In the 
first case, the quality signal used is mainly an official denomination or origin whereas the 
firms and cooperatives mainly use a private brand.  We suggest that the main difference 
between organizational forms is to be found in the choice and span of authority instruments. 
While the chain organization relies mainly on the price system through a market governance 
of the S, S+ types (see table 2), private firms and cooperatives use more hierarchical means 
such as compulsory internal rules or direct control mechanisms implemented by formal 
contracts and / or vertical integration.  
These preliminary investigations help to better understand the link between the choice 
of organizational forms (seen as multistage governance structures) and the way quality is 
managed along the chain.  We suggest for instance that the dichotomy in two subgroups 
(centralized / decentralized organizational forms) reflects the use of dissimilar means of 
vertical coordination (market versus contract versus equity alliances or integration).  Other 
determinants are also possible.  For example the degree of quality variability may vary from 
one chain to another : the need for quality control and standardization is thus different.  This 
is particularly relevant for a cross sector analysis.  Future research will be conducted on 
incentive instruments for quality requirements.  Different organizational forms will probably 
implement different incentive instruments.  Whereas the price system is at the core of the 
decentralized form, more formal allocation of the quasi rent emerge in more centralized 
system of quality management (for instance through contractual provisions).  
 
The impact of the institutional environment could also be taken into account.   
Williamson (1991) shows that the rules in the institutional environment will influence the 
choice of governance structures in modifying the level of transaction costs.  In our analysis 
we put forward the idea that the choice of governance structure in the vertical chain of 
production is a means for the owner of the sign to control the quality of products at all the 
stages of this chain. Thus, when participants in the chain influence significantly the quality of 
products, the owner of the sign will rely on governance structures closest to vertical 
integration. But the institutional environment may influence this choice by imposing external   14
control mechanisms over participants in the chain (especially for official signs). Consequently 
the need for direct quality controls by the owner could be reduced. We put forward the 
hypothesis that the choice of a governance structure is closest to vertical integration when the 
only quality sign in the case study is a private brand, versus the case studies with 
simultaneously a private brand and an official sign. 
This hypothesis in our population is confirmed in the processed meat sector. From this 
population, six case studies are chain organizations using an official quality signs, eight are 
cooperatives and unions of cooperatives using mainly private brands. Table 2 shows that the 
index of vertical control is higher in the first subgroup than in the second one. This give 
qualitative supports the previous hypothesis, at least in this population. 
4. Concluding comments 
The agrifood sector of many European countries are witnessing moves towards quality 
signaling and food safety issues.  Based on several case studies, this article analyzes the 
consequence of these quality strategies on the governance of transactions in supply chains.  It 
is shown that when an agent creates a quality signal whose value can be influenced by several 
other agents in the supply chains, he will design the governance of transactions in order to 
assure product quality and improve the credibility of his signal.  We expect the governance of 
the supply chain to be aligned with characteristics of the quality signal.  We develop a 
hypothesis linking the governance of the supply chains and the institutional environment and 
conduct a preliminary test which support the hypothesis.  
 
From a more normative point of view, the study of mechanisms designed to safeguard 
quality in the supply chains can also be useful for antitrust evaluation, when some vertical 
restraints seem necessary.  This raises the question of compatibility between specific 
contractual restraints and antitrust law (see Joskow, 2001 for an application of Transaction 
Cost Economics to this topic).  One can suggest that, far from reducing competition, some 
restraints result from the search for an efficient alignment between contractual hazards and 
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DATA AND QUALITATIVE INFORMATION COLLECTED IN THE RESEARCH 
 
Quantitative data and qualitative information have been collected at different levels. A 
first level gives information about the general environment (both competitive and institutional 
environments). This general environment defines the constraints and resources surrounding 
individual or collective strategies and actors (part A). A second level provides information 
about specific quality strategies and their organizational support through a case study 
research. Each case study research gives the main economic and institutional components of a 
strategy/structure interplay at a chain level (from input suppliers to retailers) (part B). 
 
A- GENERAL ENVIRONMENT AND QUALITY STRATEGIES : A SURVEY 
 
1- Industrial structure and institutional environment 
The objective is to describe the diversity of competitive and institutional situations at 
hand in the three selected sectors, processed meat, cheese, fruit and vegetables. Specificities 
in market structure and vertical/horizontal organization of the agrofood chains, different 
historical backgrounds, specific institutional rules overarching the national agrifood sectors 
will lead to particular conditions that will influence the definition by actors within the chain of 
their quality strategies. In order to assess these specificities, some quantitative and qualitative 
indicators provides the main characteristics of this general environment. 
 
2- Survey on the present quality systems and strategies developed in each national sectors 
The aim is to identify general differences in the types of quality strategies developed 
in each country for the selected agri-food sectors. Divergences may result from shift in 
consumer behavior and their demand for information about food quality. 
 
B-  ORGANIZATIONAL  FORMS,  QUALITY  STRATEGIES  AND  GOVERNANCE  OF 
THE QUALITY SIGNS 
 
The general objective of this part is to provide qualitative and quantitative indicators 
about governance structures supporting different types of quality strategies. A set of variables 
deal with the general characteristics of the quality signs and performance. Then the 
organization of control along the supply chain is surveyed, mainly on a qualitative basis. 
Finally, the organizational modes supporting these strategies are define through a common 
grid. This grid is based on Willimason's typology of governance structures (market, hybrid 
and hierarchy) used with some adaptations, considering the fact that our case studies 
implement multistage governance structures. 
 
1- General characteristics of the quality signal (date of creation, information delivered to 
consumers, quality specification, etc.), 
2- Performance of the quality sign (market share, price trends, reputation, etc.), 
3- Organization of quality control in the supply chain (frequency of controls, who controls 
what), 
4- Contractual relations in the chain and governance of the quality sign (type of bilateral 
governance structures in the chain, price / quantity determination, etc.) 
 